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 Hohfeldian Rights, Duties, Privileges, and 
    No-Rights  :  A Warrant-Statement Analysis 
                               Robert L. Latta 
   I wish to put forward an analysis of  the  following statements,where the 
expressions to be substituted for the variables  'A' and 'B'  refer to persons, 
and the terms  ̀ right,'  duty,"privilege,' and  ̀ no-right'  have the meanings 
given them by W. N. Hohfeld : 
      A has a duty to B  to  .do X. 
     B has a right that A do  X.
      A has a duty to B  not  to do  X. 
     B has a right  that  A- notdo  X.
     A has the privilege with  respect to B  of doing X. 
      B has a no-right that A  note do 
     A has the privilege with respect to B of not doing  X. 
      B has a no-right that A do X. 
(I have not,  of course,  actually written  out the statements I propose to 
analyze. Rather, I have written out several sentence forms related to those 
statements, sentence forms by  reference  to  which, in virtue of that relation, 
those statements can be  identified. If I were challenged to specify the 
relation in question, my  reply  would run, basically, as follows. The  state- 
ments I propose to analyze are those statements that one would be making 
were he to use sentences of  the above forms to make statements—suppos-
ing, of course, no changes to  have been made in the meanings of those 
sentences as determined by English usage, with the modifications due to 
Hohfeld. For the sake of simplicity of exposition, I will, except where 
otherwise indicated, continue to refer to  'A has a duty to B to do X' etc. 
as statements.) 
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  It is seldom entirely clear, I think, just what it is that a philosopher 
proposes to put forward when he  proposes to put forward an analysis. Let 
me explain, then, that my claim to have analyzed the statements listed 
above will be the claim to have  presented a systematic set of restatements 
of them. The restatements of  'A has a duty to B to do X' etc. which I 
shall put forward will be marked by the fact that the terms  `right,'  duty,' 
 `privilege' and  ̀ no-right' will be excluded from them. 
   We may, I suppose, demand of any analysis of this type, i. e., of any 
set of statements  put forward  as,  restatements  of  some original set of state-
ments, that it be (1)  correct, and (2) useful. What is it  then, we may ask, 
for an analysis of this type to  be. correct  ?  Perhaps we may best approach 
this question by asking  another  : What do we  claim to have  clone in 
claiming to have restated a given  statement  ? The  answer, I think, is that 
we claim to have put that statement, given in certain  words,  in different 
words. This, at any rate, is how this claim  is, to be understood when made 
in this paper. A restatement of a given  statement, is correct,  then,  when the 
former and the latter are  in fact  the  same statement, put in  two different 
ways. An analysis which, like  the one I will  propose, consists of such 
restatements is then correct  when, each of its component  restatements is 
correct. It appears, then, that a, and perhaps  the, conclusive test of the 
correctness of a restatement, a rewording,  of  a statement given in certain 
words, as, ultimately,  of  an analysis consisting of such  restatements, is this. 
Is it the case that,  in any context in which one would be  making  the given 
statement in uttering  the  words  in which it is given, one would be making 
that same statement in uttering  the words put forward as  a  rewording of 
that  statement  ? 
   One  of  my reasons for spelling out this conclusive test of the correct-
ness of a restatement of  a, given statement  is this.  I  do,  not, plan to 
make use (or at any rate, extensive  use) of  conclusive tests of the correct-
ness of  the  various  parts of  my  analysis. For just this reason, problems 
will arise as to the degrees of strength, that is to  say, the  degrees of con-
clusiveness, of the tests I will use. My thought is that reference  to this  con-
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 elusive test might, in some  'cases,  throW light on the  strength of,  or  at least 
the rationale behind,  the 'inconclusive tests that I shall use. 
   One inconclusive (perhaps very inconclusive) test  to. which I shall  p'ut 
my  analysis  is  thiS. Does it appear  to  be  useful  ?  In arguing that it  does; I 
 Will, at certain points in the paper, be arguing for  and applying  my analysis 
 simultaneously. By a useful analysis (Of the  type  ,  am  undertaking), I 
understand an  analySis that gives us certain  insights  (but not  Others) which 
we would not  otherwise have, and that  keeps us from  falling into  certain 
 confusions  (but not into others)  into which  We  would perhaps otherwise 
fall. I will not claim to have  shown,  by-means of  my analysis anything 
that is fundamental in any absolute sense about Hohfeldian rights,  duties; 
privileges, and  na=rights. 
   Perhaps I should add that I am concerned  to bring out,  by  means of 
my restatements of the statements listed at the  head of this paper, certain 
 features of those  statements that  are  strikingly evident under the type  of 
analysis  I shall  adoPt. I  will not consider  my enterprise on  the whole a 
failure if my restatements are incomplete or inaccurate  with  respect to some 
 of  the other features of  these  original  statements: 
   I speak above  of a  systematie set Of restatements of the statements 
listed at the head of this paper, and  of  the type of analysis which  I shall 
adopt.  What makes the set  of  restatements I  shall:put forward a  syStematic 
set is  the  fact that it constitutes an analysis  of 'a  certain type. I shall refer 
to analyses of this type as warrant statement analyses. A warrant statement 
 analysiS of a  statement  consists in  the  restatement of  it as an explicit 
 warrant. statement. A  warrant  statement, , to  cinote  RObert  J. Fogelin,  the 
founder of warrant statement analysis, is  "any,  statement that indicates 
something about the evidential backing available for some further  state-
ment." He offers the following  as an  example of a warrant statement ; 
 `There is strong evidence available  on behalf  of  the  claim.: "There is life 
on  Mars."  ' 
 Fogelin's definition of a warrant  statement immediately gives rise to a 
 question.  Why does he not say simply that a warrant statement is any 
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statement about the evidential backing available for some further  state-
ment ? At  least part of the reason, I  think, is this. He wants to include 
within the class of warrant statements certain statements about subjects 
other than available evidential backing, in making which a person would 
nevertheless in a sense be saying something about available evidential 
backing. For  example,  he  would argue that  the,. statement  'Jones knows 
that Smith is the killer' is a warrant statement which can be restated, 
roughly, as  follows  :  'Jones has at his command  information which con-
stitutes conclusive evidential backing for the  claim  : "Smith is  the  killer."  ' 
Ordinarily, I suppose, one would say that either  of these is a statement 
about Jones. (I am not quite sure why one would say this—perhaps because 
 `Jones' is the grammatical subject of both sentences.) Nevertheless, in 
making the second of these statements, and hence, if Fogelin's analysis is 
correct, also in making the first, one would in a sense be saying something 
about the evidential backing available for a claim—viz., that it is available 
to Jones, that it is conclusive with respect to the claim in question, and 
perhaps other things. 
   An explicit warrant statement is a warrant statement  which; like  'There 
is strong evidence available  on  behalf of the  claim  : "There is life on 
 Mars,"  ' or  'Jones has at  his command  information which constitutes 
conclusive evidential backing for the  claim  :  'Smith is the killer,"  '  is put 
in such a grammatical form that it can be recognized upon inspection as a 
warrant statement. An implicit warrant statement may be defined as a 
warrant statement that is not put in such a grammatical form. Thus, if 
the analysis for which I said Fogelin  would  argue  is correct,  'Jones knows 
that Smith is the  killer' is an implicit warrant statement. 
   We may quite naturally  divide the sentence  'There is strong evidence 
available on behalf of the  claim  : "There is life on  Mars"  ' into two com-
ponents. By means of the first component—that part of the sentence which 
stands before the colon—a reference is made to certain available evidential 
backing, though of course this is not the only thing done by means of 
this component. By means of the second component—that part of the 
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sentence which follows the colon—the statement the evidential backing 
for which is in question is identified. I shall, borrowing the terms from 
Fogelin, refer to the first component of this sentence as the warrant 
component, and to the second component as the material component. 
Every explicit warrant statement  will , have a warrant component and a 
material component. I think that this is  a. consequence of what I have 
said about explicit warrant statements, though it could be made a matter 
of definition. 
   Now as warrant statements have thus far been defined, their material 
components may refer only to statements, that is, roughly speaking, only 
to utterances that are true or false. I wish now, in duplication of a move 
Fogelin  makes  in  trying to show that value judgments are warrant state-
ments, to liberalize the definition of a warrant statement in  order to allow 
that the material component of a warrant statement may refer either to a 
statement or to a prescription. 
   But what, it may be asked, is a prescription ? The following remarks, 
though certainly inadequate as a full account of prescriptions, may throw 
a little light on this question. By a prescription, I understand a direct 
answer to a question which is a request for directions—that is to say, to a 
question which is a request for, for example, advice or recommendations. 
Questions which are requests for  directions. may, I think, usefully be 
contrasted with questions which are requests for information, although I 
do not want to be understood to imply that all  questions are requests 
either for directions or for information. To give a few examples of ques-
tions of these two types : In many, or most, cases in which a  person, asks 
 `What am I to  do  ?' or  'What is to be done ?'
,  he is making a request for 
directions (though these words can also be used to make requests for 
predictions). Similarly, in many or most cases in which a person asks 
 `What is the  case  ?  '
, he is making  a. request for information.  'Do such 
and such  !  ' is a direct answer to either of the first two of these questions, 
and hence is a prescription, where an indirect answer to either of these 
questions would consist either (1) of a list of reasons for or against certain 
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 alternative courses of action, or (2) of assurances that reasons of (a)  an 
 indicated  degree  of  conclusiveness, or (b) a degree of conclusiveness not 
indicated are available  for  or against  certain alternative courses of action. 
   Let me try to  cut  off a potential  source of confusion. The question 
 `What am I to do  ?  ' may be answered indirectly, according to what is said 
above, by  giving reasons for or  against  certain alternative courses of action. 
We may  well  imagine at least some of  these  reasons being of the kind : 
such and such is the case—e. g.,  'If you do this, then this will happen.' In 
a certain context, therefore, in which the question  'What am I to  do  ?  ' is 
 asked, he who asks the  question  may want an  indirect answer, and in this 
sense,  his  question may be a  request  for  information. But still, presumably 
he wants this indirect answer as a means of  arriving  at a direct answer to 
his question, to give  which will be  to give directions (to himself, if he put 
the question to himself). The question  'What am I to  do  ?  ' is, then, even 
in such a context as that which I have hypothesized, ultimately, in the 
 sense I  have  explained, a request for  directions. Similarly for  'What is to 
 be;  done  ?  '  etc. 
   A problem  is still posed,  however,  by  questions like  'What should be 
done ?  ', for they  appear  to be at  once requests for  directions  and requests 
 for information, since answers like  'Do such and such  !  '  and answers like 
 `Such and such should be done'  seem equally appropriate and direct. I 
 will  deal with this problem by stating how I would classify such questions 
(whether  as requests  for directions  or for information  or for both or 
neither). I will not, for lack of space, argue extensively for the correct-
ness of this  classification. I will limit my purpose to that of making more 
readily  comprehensible my  discussion  of prescriptions by way of showing 
in outline how I  would deal with a possible  objection to it. In a word, 
then, a question of the type indicated above appears to me to be a request 
for information the  giving of which  would constitute an indirect reply of 
type (2)(a) above to a request for directions. So, if I am correct, in asking 
 a  question like  'What should be done  ?  ',  one does not make a request for 
directions ; rather, one makes a request for information concerning the 
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available reasons for or against certain courses of: action. 
   In defense of this  position  : Let the  reader ask himself why  there exist 
in English the two distinct locutions :  (1)  'What is to  be  done  ?: and (2) 
'What  e should be done  ?'
,  . Their existence should, I think,  make  him 
suspect that  they have different functions. The  difference  I think  I  see  is 
this. In asking question (2), one is asking, roughly,  'For which courses 
of action  are  =there good reasons  ?  ',  whereas in asking question  0), no 
such request is  made  for information concerning reasons for adopting a 
course or  courses, of action. I leave it to the reader's linguistic intuitions 
to convince him of this, although this appeal to  linguistic  intuitions will 
doubtless be weakened by the fact that  '  What  is to  be  done  ?  ' can be 
answered by  'There are reasons of a conclusive  nature  for doing such and 
such,' since one who  says this may be presumed to believe that  ,`Do  such 
 and, such  !  '  is a  correct  answer  to  the  question, and by  the fact that  'What 
should be done  ?  ' can be answered  by  `Do  such and such  !  ',  since one 
 who says this may be presumed  to believe that  there are  reasons  of a  con-
clusive  nature , for doing such and such. Note that I am  not  claiming that 
in asking the question  'What should be done  ?  ', a  request is  made that 
 reasons,  for courses of  action be  spelled,  out. Such  a claim would  be false, 
since this question  is fully answered by  'Such and such  should  be done,' 
to state which is not to spell out reasons  for courses  of  action.  What I 
 have said concerning  What  should be  done  ?  ' I  would,  of  course, apply 
to  'What should I do  ?  ',  etc. 
   I will not  enmesh  myself further  in  the subtleties  that surround the 
distinction between requests  for directions and  requests for information, 
except to say that I recognize that the question  might  ,be thought to remain 
whether  I, have clearly  enough defined  the  notion of a direct answer to a 
question which is  a, request  for  directions, by giving a large enough  list  (at 
the top of page  6) of types of indirect answers to such a question. 
Now I return to  the, problem of liberalizing the definition of  a warrant 
statement. 
   The warrant component of a warrant statement whose material  com-
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ponent refers to a prescription will not, of course, refer to evidential 
backing for that  presCription, for such backing is not appropriate to pre-
scriptions. Some  of my readers may  Wish to add that no kind of backing 
is appropriate to prescriptions,  i.e., that prescriptions are  not the kind of 
thing for which arguments can be given. But it  appears to me that a 
strong presumption is established against this view by the fact that people 
 do give arguments  fln.  prescriptions. Consider the following  exchange  : 
"Buy the pair of boots  Made.  in Austria ! —Why ? —Because they are the 
sturdiest, lightest,  and  cheapest." Here an argument is given for a  pre-
scription  (though  it appears to  be  -enthymernatic, and might be more fully 
 stated:as  follows  :  "  Because  they are the sturdiest, lightest, and cheapest 
available, and  one should buy the  sturdiest; lightest, and cheapest boots 
 available."). I can  see nothing wrong  in  prinCiple with  such arguments. 
Note that the  argument for the  prescriptiOn concerning the boots is not an 
argument for giving that prescription, but rather an argument for following 
it.  One. might  try, then; to develop the following parallel. An argument 
for a prescription is  not an argument  fin. giving that prescription, but 
rather an argument for accepting that  presCription (as to be followed), as 
an argument for an  assertion is not an argument for making that assertion, 
but rather an argument for  accepting that  assertion (as true). I will not, 
however, try to do this.  It is enough  for my immediate purposes to have 
lent, as I conceive it, considerable plausibility to the thesis that arguments 
may be given for prescriptions, and hence to the thesis that it makes sense 
to speak of the backing for a  prescription, the backing for a prescription 
being that which can be presented as an argument  for it, i.e., for accepting it. 
   I have now,  I think,  ghTen initially adequate answers to the  questions:
What is a warrant statement  analysis  ? How can such  an analysis be 
 appraised  ? What can be expected from such an  analysis  ? It remains to 
give such an analysis of the statements listed at the head of this paper. 
   There are  countlessly many kinds of warrant statements. Backing 
may be denied to be available for a given claim or a given prescription, 
may be asserted to be available for a claim or a prescription, may or may 
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not be said to be of such and such a degree of conclusiveness, where in the 
former case, any  degree of conclusiveness may be claimed, and this claim 
put forward in any one of many different ways—e.  g.  , by means of an 
evaluation ("There is good reason to conclude  that.  .  .")—may or may not 
be characterized as pertaining to a certain subject matter, and that any 
subject  matter  ; neither let us overlook the fact that a warrant  statement; 
in accordance with all that I have said, may do more than indicate some-
thing about the backing available for a further statement or a prescription. 
What kind of warrant statements might the statements listed at the head 
of this paper be,  then  ? I begin with the conjecture that they are implicit 
warrant statements whose explicit warrant statement restatements are of 
the  form  :  'There is conclusive backing available for the statement or 
prescription  "p,"  ' and the forms obtained from this form by negating 
either its warrant component or its material component or both, where, of 
course, the expressions to be substituted for "p" are formulations either of 
statements or of prescriptions. (It will shortly become somewhat clearer 
what this means.) A sentence in either the declarative or the imperative 
mood, then, may be substituted for "p." In thus allowing "p" to range 
over prescriptions as well as statements, I depart, needless to say, from 
the  function, usually allotted this variable in books on symbolic logic. 
That an argument for a prescription—which, as far as I can see, amounts 
to an argument for pursuing the course of action enjoined by that pre-
scription—may  in some ordinary sense of the word be conclusive, I leave 
as an unargued assumption. 
   I will make use of the following  abbreviations  :  `Wp' for  'There is 
conclusive backing available for the statement or prescription  "p"' ; 
 `WNp' for  'There is conclusive backing available for the statement or 
prescription "not  p,"'  i. e., for the statement that p is not the case or the 
prescription which enjoins not doing what the prescription "p" enjoins 
 doing  ;  `NWNp' for  'It is not the case  that there is conclusive backing 
available for the statement or prescription "not  p"'  ; and  `1\1Wp' for  'It 
is not the case that there is conclusive backing available for the statement 
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or prescription  "p."' Now if  the  statements under analysis (those listed 
at the  head of this paper) can be restated as  statements of the forms  ̀ Wp,` 
 `WNp
,'  1\TWNp,' and  `NWp,' then all the logical  relations  that hold 
among all statements  of  these forms will hold also among those statements. 
That is to say, if, for example,  'A has a duty to B to do X' can  be, restated 
as a statement of the form  `Wp,' and  'A has a duty to B not to do X' can 
be restated as a statement of the form  `WNp,' and the logical relation R 
(contrariety, say)  holds between any two  statements  respectively of the 
forms  `Wp' and  `WNp,'  then  that same relation R must hold between  'A 
has a duty to B to do X' and  'A has a  duty. to B  not, to do X,' for these 
 are then,  by hypothesis, the same two  statements as a certain two  state.; 
 meets respectively of the  fOrms  ̀Wp' and  `WNp.'  It  will be useful  to find 
out, therefore,  what  logical  relatiOns hold among  `Wp,'  WNp,"NWNp,' 
and  `NNVp,' for this will enable us to conduct a test of their adequacy as 
 restatements of the statements under analysis by asking whether those 
same relations hold also  among  'the statements under analysis. If they do 
not, then statements of the forms  `Wp' etc. cannot serve as restatements 
of the statements under analysis. 
   (1)  ̀ Wp' and  `N-Wp' are contradictories, i.  6.-  (a) if one is  true, the 
other is false, and (b) if  one  is,  false, the other is true. This is evident 
from the fact that the second is the explicit denial  of the first. (2)  ̀ WNp' 
and  `NWNp' are contradictories, as is  similarly evident. (3)  ̀ Wp' and 
 `WNp' are contraries
,  i.  e. (a) if one  is.  true, the other is false, and  (b) if 
one is false, the other might be true and might be false. The denial of (a), 
if "p" is interpreted as  a statement, leads to an absurdity. For on the 
 assumption that there is conclusive backing available both for the  state-
ment "p" and for the statement  "not  p," both  "p" and  "not p" are true, 
and thus it is the  case  that p and not p, which is absurd. Or suppose 
that "p" is interpreted as a prescription, in particular, to make the argu-
ment concrete, the  prescription  :  "Buy  a  Toyota rather than a Suzuki ! ". 
This amounts  to interpreting  csiVp' as  'There is conclusive backing available 
for the  prescription  : "Buy a Toyota  rather than a Suzuki !  "  '. Suppose 
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further that  `Wp' is true and that the  conclusive backing it refers to takes 
the form of the premisses of the following  argument  : 
 (1) A Toyota and a Suzuki are the  only options. 
      (2) From  among the options, buy that car which is the  safest  ! 
      (3) A Toyota is safer than a Suzuki. 
      (4)  Buy a Toyota rather than a  Suzuki  ! 
This appears to me to be a valid argument (valid, of course, in a wider 
sense than the usual). Premisses (1) and (3) are statements of fact. Prem-
iss (2) is  'a prescription which expresses a criterion of choice  (perhaps , it 
does other things as well). Now if  (1)–(3) constitute conclusive backing 
for (4), then,  'it seems to me, (1) and (3) must be true. So the question 
whether  `WNp' (as well as  `Wp')  can be true in the circumstances under 
consideration becomes, I think, the question whether there can, in these 
circumstances, be constructed a conclusive argument  of the  form  : 
      (1') A Toyota and a Suzuki are the only options. 
 (2') 
      (3') A Toyota  is safer than a Suzuki. 
      (4')  Do not buy a Toyota rather than a  Suzuki  ! 
Now premiss (2'), it seems to me,  must  be  'From among the options, do 
 not, buy that car which is the  safest  ! if together with (1') and (3') it is to 
yield (4'). So the question becomes whether, whatever mode of justifi-
cation is appropriate to  (2) and to (2') (it might, for example, be said to 
consist of reference to the desires of the parties concerned), (2') can, in 
the circumstances described, be justified. It appears to me that  it cannot 
be justified, for if  it,  could,  then,, it seems to me,  (1)–(3) would not  consti-
tute conclusive backing for (4), because (2) would then be liable to aban-
donment in favor of (2'). This is the best argument that I am able to put 
forward, in the lack of a developed and well-established logic of prescrip-
tions, for the claim that  `Wp' and  `WNp' cannot both be true, where "p" 
is interpreted as a prescription. (It  might be objected, whether with justice 
 I am not entirely  sure, that (1') and (3')  'need not be the same statements 
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as (1) and (3), but rather need only be consistent with (1) and (3), and so 
(2') need not be what I say it must be. It  might be said that (3') might 
be, for example,  'A Toyota is a shoddier car than a Suzuki,' where (2') is 
 `From among the options , do not buy that car which is the  shoddiest  ! 
But even if this objection is sound, the acceptability of (2'), where  (1')—(3') 
yield (4'), implies, I think, the liability of (2) to abandonment, and hence 
the lack of conclusiveness of  (1)—(3) with respect to (4).) As for (3)(b) on 
page 10 above, it is clear that conclusive backing might be available  neither 
for the statement "p" nor for the statement  "not  p," that conclusive reasons 
might be unavailable both for doing  such and such and for not doing such 
and such (so that whatever one did, one could not be sure of having chosen 
the right action), that in cases in which conclusive backing is not available 
for the statement or prescription "p," it might still be available for "not 
p," and that in cases in which conclusive backing is not available for the 
statement or prescription "not p," it might still be available for "p." (4) 
 `NWNp' and  `NWp' are subcontraries
,  i. e. (a) if one is false, the other 
is true, and (b) if one is true, the other might be false and might be true. 
This follows from (1)—(3), for since the possible distributions of  truth-
values between  Tip' and  `WNp' are T—F, F—T, and F—F, but not T—T, 
the possible distributions of truth-values between  `NWp' and  `NVVNp,' 
their  respective contradictories, are F—T, T—F, and T—T, but not  F—F. 
 We can represent the logical relationships turned up in the course of this 
paragraph by means of the following square of opposition, where the 
statements at the top are contraries, those at the bottom are subcontraries, 
and those diagonally across from one another are contradictories (I give 
only the points at the corners  and  ask the reader to imagine the rest) : 
 Wp WNp 
 NWNp NWp 
   Can we, then, construct a similar square of opposition for the state-
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ments under  analysis  ? The first thing we notice is that there are eight of 
them, whereas a square of opposition has  only four corners. This,  how-
ever, I do not believe to be a serious problem, for  I think we may gather 
from  Hohfeld's text  (1) that  'A has a duty to B to do X' is a restatement 
of  'B has a right that A do X,' (2) that  '  A has a duty to B not to do X' is 
a restatement of  'B has a right that A not do X,' (3) that  '  A has the privi-
lege with respect to B of doing X' is a restatement of  'B has a no-right 
that A not do X,' and (4) that  '  A has the privilege with respect to  .B of 
not doing X' is a restatement of  `B has a no-right that A do  X.' For 
Hohfeld calls A's duty to B to do X and B'sright that A do X correla-
tives, and refers to correlatives as equivalents .o But if A's duty to B to do 
X and B's right that A do X are equivalents, i. e., are the same legal 
relation, then to state that A has a duty to B to do X, which is to assert 
 that that legal relation obtains, is to state that B has a right that A do X, 
for this is then to assert that that same legal relation obtains. Similarly 
for (2)—(4) just above. (There remains, of course, the problem in what way 
saying  '  A has a duty to B to do X' differs from saying  '13 has a right that 
A do X,' where in saying either, one makes the same statement that one 
makes in saying the other. Put in more Hohfeldian terms , this is the 
problem in what way saying  '  A has a duty to B to do X' differs from 
saying  ̀ .13 has a right that A do X,' where the reference is to the same legal 
relation. Similarly for the other correlatives.) 
   I wish now to show that  I  :  'A has a duty to B to do  X,' or  'Bs has a 
right  that A do X,' and  IV  :  '  A has the privilege with respect to B of not 
doing X,' or  '13 has a no-right that A do X,' are  contradictories. Hohfeld 
says that a privilege is the precise negation of the duty of opposite tenor. 
A's privilege with respect to B of not doing X, then, is the precise nega-
tion of A's duty to B to do X. But then A's privilege with respect to B of 
not doing X is the same legal relation as A's lack of a duty (if I may so 
speak) to B to do  X. But then  '  A has the privilege with respect to B of 
not doing X' and  '  A does not have a duty to B to do X' are restatements 
of one another, and hence  '  A has the privilege with respect to B of not 
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doing  X' and  'A has  a  duty to B to do X' are denials of one another, and 
hence are contradictories. (Hohfeld also says—if this be necessary to the 
argument—that a  no-privilege equals the duty of opposite tenor,  and thus 
he is, it seems, committed to saying that  a duty is the precise negation of 
the  privilege of opposite tenor.) It follows that I and IV above  are"  con-
tradictories, given that the two statements listed under I, as also the two 
statements listed under IV, are restatements  Of one another. Here  I  should 
 stress'  that; with  Hohfeld,' am concerned with rights, duties, privileges, 
and no-rights insofar as they  are considered  as legal  relations, and that 
therefore  I  am not trying to take into  account the  complications that 
might  'arise' if some of these  relations  were, considered as legal relations, 
and others as legal or  moral.  or..  . relations. 
   Now  II  :  'A has a duty to B not to do X,' or  ̀ .8 has a right that A 
not  dO X,'  and III  :  'A has the privilege with respect to B of doing X,' or 
 `11 has a no-right that A not do X,' are also  contradictories, by reasoning 
similar to that above, with the same  qualification. Furthermore, I  :  'A 
 has a duty to B to  do X,'  or  'B has a right that A do X,' and  II  :  'A has a 
duty to B not to do X,' or  'B has a right that A not do X' are contraries. 
 For (1) it might  'be the  case that A  has neither a duty to B to do  X  nor a 
duty to B not to do X, as ordinarily would be the case,  for example, if it 
were  truly said that A has the privilege with respect  to  'B of not doing  X  ; 
and (2) if A has a duty to B to do X, then A does not have a  duty. to B 
not to do X, as, similarly, if A has a duty to B not to do X, then A does 
not have a  duty  to B to do  X.  I. here assume a legal system which cannot 
give rise to conflicting duties.  The  justification  for  making' this  assump-
tion is that it is, to all appearances,  ,an assumption of Hohfeld. How to 
analyze statements ascribing duties etc.  when made  in  circumstances in 
which conflicts of duties  are possible is thus a question, and a  most  inter-
esting one, with which I  will not here concern  myself. 
   It follows from what has been said that  III  :  'A has the privilege with 
respect to B of doing X,' or  'B has a  no-right that A not do X,' and  IV  : 
 `A has the  .privilege with respect to B of not doing X,' or  'B has a  no-
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right that A  do X,' are subcontraries, by reasoning similar to that pre-
sented above (see page 12). We may, then, represent  certain , of the 
logical relations (contrariety, contradictoriness, and subcontrariety) which 
hold among  I—IV by means  of a square of opposition which is  to , be 
interpreted in the same way as  the square on page  12, of this paper. My 
hypothesis, viz., that the statements under analysis are implicit warrant 
statements whose explicit warrant statement restatements are of the  form  : 
 `There  is conclusive backing a
vailable for the statement or prescription 
 "p"' (and the related forms d
escribed above), has thus passed a fairly 
comprehensive test for logical isomorphism which it had to pass in order 
to remain tenable. The square of opposition is the  following  : 
 I : A has a duty to B to  II  : A has a duty to B not 
 doX  to  do  X 
         B has a right that A B has a right that A 
 doX  not  doX 
 III  : A has the privilege IV : A has  the privilege with 
          with respect to B respect to B of not 
      of doing X doing X 
          B has a no-right that B has a no-right that 
 A  not  do  X  A  do  X 
It is  evident, upon  perusal of the two squares of opposition so far pre-
sented (see page  12 above)  that if the statements listed under  I—IV are to 
be restated in  the forms  `Wp,'  WNp,"NWNp,' and  `NWp,' then, if the 
logical isomorphism which has  been shown to obtain between  `Wp,' 
 `WNp
,'  NWNp,' and  `NWp' and  I—IV respectively is to be preserved as 
between  I—IV and their respective restatements , as must be the  case if 
 these restatements are to be correct, then I must be restated in the form 
 `Wp' (and not
, e. g., in the form  ̀ WNp'), II in the form  `WNp,' III in the 
form  ̀ NWNp,' and IV in the form  ̀ NWp.' 
   It is interesting to note, though not  immediately relevant to my  argu-
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ment, that if we define A's privilege with respect to B with respect to 
doing X as A's  privilege  (s) with respect to B of doing X and of not doing 
X, then a privilege in this sense—a type of privilege which has been said 
to be of importance in the analysis of legal interests—may be represented, 
as in the following triangular array, as the contrary respectively of A's 
duty to B to  do  X and of A's duty to B not to do  X  : 
     (1)  A  has a duty to B  to. (2) A has a duty to B not 
 do  X.  to  do  X. 
     (3) (a) A has the privilege with respect to B of doing 
        X and (b) A has the privilege with respect to B
         of not doing  X. 
For suppose (1) to be false. Also suppose (2) to be  true. Then (3)(a) is 
false. But then (3) is false. So (1) and (3) can both be false. Now 
suppose (1) to be true. Then (3)(b) is false. But then (3) is false. So (1) 
and (3) cannot both be true. Similarly for (2) and (3). We might, 
furthermore, expect this triangular array to replace the square of opposi-
tion above as a  representation of the relations of the concepts of privilege 
and duty as they occur in speech, if the terms  'privilege' and  'duty' in 
Hohfeld's meanings of them came into widespread use. We might expect 
this due to the operation of the rule of  strength  : "Do not  affirm an I or 
an 0 proposition where you think yourself warranted in affirming an A 
or an E  proposition  !  " which has as a  corollary  : "Do not affirm one 
subcontrary where you think yourself warranted in denying the other ! ". 
   Let us return now to the square of opposition  for  `Wp,"WNp,' 
 `NWNp
,' and  'N'Wp.' Now if "p" is interpreted as a statement, then (1) 
 `Wp' implies "p
," (2) "p" implies  ̀ NWNp,' (3)  `WNp' implies "not p," 
and (4) "not p" implies  ̀ NWp.' This is fairly obvious, and I will not go 
through the arguments for it. But I wish also to urge (1') that if there 
are available conclusive reasons for following the prescription "p," then 
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the prescription "p" is to be followed, (2') that if the prescription "p" is 
to be followed, then it is not the case that there are available conclusive 
reasons for not following the prescription "p," (3') that if there are avail-
able conclusive reasons for not following the prescription "p," then the 
prescription "p" is not to be followed, and (4') that if the prescription 
"p" is not to be followed
, then it is not the case that there are available 
conclusive reasons for following the prescription  "p." In the preceding 
sentence, as elsewhere, I treat the predicate  'is to be followed,' as applied 
to prescriptions, as an analogue of the predicate  'is true,' as applied to 
statements, in accordance with the parallel I suggest on page 8 above. 
   Now (1') and (3') seem clearly enough to be true (they are, I think, 
the kind of claim one usually accepts pending a disclosure of the use to 
which they will be put), though I suspect that (2') and (4') will run into 
some resistance. For I imagine the reader saying to himself with respect 
to (2'), for example, that it might well be the case that the prescription 
"p" is to be followed for certain reasons
, while yet there are other consid-
erations which conclusively establish that the prescription "p" is not to be 
followed. Let me explain, then, that when I say "if the prescription  `p' is 
to be  followed  .  .  . ," I mean "if the prescription  `p' is to be followed in a 
particular situation, given all the factors in that situation that are relevant 
to the question whether  `p' is to be followed or not—i. e., relevant facts 
(e. g., that the boots are the sturdiest, lightest, and cheapest available), 
criteria of choice (e. g., that one should buy the sturdiest, lightest, and 
cheapest boots available), and perhaps factors of other kinds." I want to 
ensure by means of this explanation that in considering (2'), the reader 
assume that the grounds against which the statements (a) that the pre-
scription "p" is to be  followed  and (b) that there are not available con-
clusive reasons for not following the prescription "p" are to be judged 
are held constant. Similarly for (4').  This is all that I will say in defense 
of  (1')—(4'). 
  I take the import of  (1')—(4') to be that where the term  'implies' is 
understood in a broad sense which I will not try to specify accurately, a 
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sense  considerably broader than that given it in textbooks  on. logic, (1)—(4) 
above hold whether "p" is interpreted as a statement or as a prescription. 
I conclude  that we may expand  upon the square of opposition given on 
page 12 above in the following way, where the reader is asked to imagine 
four arrows representing implication in  a  broad sense  running, from  `Wp' 
to "p," from "p"  to  ̀ NWNp,' from  ̀ WNp'  to "not p," and from "not p" 
 to  ̀ NWp'  : 
 Wp WNp 
p  not  p 
 NWNp NWp 
Notice that the  intermediates. "p" and "not p" are the material compo-
nents of the warrant statements  `Wp' and  ̀ WNp.' 
   The square above represents a logical property of the family of state-
ments  ̀ Wp'  etc. which is not represented by the  squate on page 12 above. 
Does the family of statements under analysis share this  property  ? I 
would say that in the  sense in which  ̀ Wp' implies "p," where "p" is inter-
preted as a prescription,  'A has a duty to B to do X' implies the  prescrip-
tion.  'A, do  X  !'. That is, if A does have a duty to  B to do X, then the 
prescription  'A, do  X  !' is to be  followed (though not necessarily given). 
Put in yet a  different  way,  . if A has a duty to B to do X, then A is to do 
 X.  Similarly, I would say that  'A has a  duty  to B not to do X' implies, 
in the same  broad  sense  of that term,  the  .prescription  'A, do not do  X  !'  . 
Here again  let the reader assume that the grounds  against, which, for 
example,  'A has  a duty to B to do X' and  'A is to do  X' are to be judged 
are held  constant. 
   To  continue, that A  is: to do  X  implies, in the same way in  which  "p" 
implies  ̀ NWNp,' where "p" is a prescription, that A does not have a duty 
 not  to do  X, and hence that A  does not have a  duty to  B. not to do  X. 
But,  at  least with the qualification that only legal relations are  in question, 
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 `A does not have a duty to B  not to do  X' is a restatement  of  'A has the 
privilege with respect to B of doing X.' Similarly for the statement that 
A is not to do  X. I conclude that we may expand.  upon the square  of 
opposition given on page 15 above in the following way, where the reader 
is asked to imagine four arrows representing implication in a broad sense 
running from I to  'A, do  X!', from  'A, do  X!' to  III, from II to  'A, do 
not  do.  XV, and from  'A, do not do  X!' to  IV  : 
 I II 
 A,  do  X  !  A,  do  not  do  X  ! 
  III  IV 
   Once again, then, my incipient warrant statement analysis has  sur-
vived a test for logical isomorphism, although that test was not,  unfortu'- 
nately, put in terms as clear as it might have been, due to  ignorance' (my 
ignorance, to be sure, though I suspect it  is widely shared) of the precise 
nature of the logical relations of which prescriptions are capable. Now 
given the square of opposition immediately above, together with that 
immediately before it, together with my hypothesis that the explicit warrant 
statement restatement of  'A has a duty to B  to do X' is of the form  ̀ Wp,' 
etc., I will put forward tentatively, and then go  on  to qualify and explain 
somewhat, the following warrant statement analysis.  (1)  ̀ A has  a duty to 
B to do X' or  'B has a right that  A do X' may be restated  as,  follows  : 
 `There is conclusive backing available for the  prescription  : "A, do  X!"''; 
(2)  'A has a duty  to  B' not to do X' or  'B has a right that A not  do  X' 
may be restated :  'There is conclusive backing available for the  prescrip-
tion :  'A, do not do  X!"' ; (3)  'A has the privilege with respect to  B of 
doing  X' or  'B has a  no-right  that A not do X' may be  restated  :  'It is 
not the case that there is conclusive backing available for the  prescription  : 
"A
, do not do  X!"'; and (4)  'A has the  privilege with respect to B  of 
                            — 19 —
 140-1--'79fVEMI671-6' 
not doing X' or  `.8 has a no-right that A do X' may be  restated  :  'It is 
not the case that there is conclusive backing available for the prescrip-
tion : "A, do  X  !"'. 
   Now this is clearly inadequate as it stands, since there is no reference 
to B in my warrant statement restatements. Now suppose A's duty to B 
in (1) above arises from A's having made a contract with B. Then this 
fact will clearly be part (at least) of the conclusive backing for  'A, do  X!' 
referred to in the warrant statement under (1). This, it seems to me, 
illustrates the way in which a reference to B is to be secured. I will 
therefore stipulate that in the case of the warrant statements listed under 
(1) and (2) above,  the conclusive backing in question includes, or amounts 
to, the fact that A has undergone a legal transaction of a certain sort with 
B. will not try to specify what sort of legal transaction is in question 
here.) In the case of the warrant statements listed under (3) and (4), the 
point is  that. A has not undergone with B any legal transaction of the sort 
in question. 
   The fact that rights, duties, privileges, and no-rights, insofar as I am 
here concerned with them, are legal relations, is, then, reflected in the fact 
that the backing referred to in each warrant statement from (1) through 
(4) includes, or consists of, legal considerations—that such and such a 
legal contract was made, for example. My analysis thus suggests an 
explanation of the gross similarities and dissimilarities of legal, moral, 
and other kinds of rights, duties, etc. Statements ascribing them are all 
warrant statements having prescriptions as material components, but the 
backing referred to in a statement ascribing, e. g., a legal duty is of a 
different character from that referred to in a statement ascribing,  e.  g., a 
moral duty. I take the provision of this explanation to be an advantage 
of the present analysis. 
   Let me avert a possible misunderstanding. According to my analysis, 
A has the privilege with respect to B of doing X unless A has a duty to B 
not to do  X, and A has a duty to B not to do  X only when there is con-
clusive backing available for the  prescription  : "A, do not do  X  !". In 
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any other case, e. g., when there is some, but inconclusive, backing avail-
able for "A, do not do  X  !", A has the privilege in question but not the 
duty in question. Similar remarks hold for A's having the privilege with 
respect to B of not doing X, in relation to A's having a duty to B to do 
X. Thus, it seems to me, my analysis is compatible with the fact that a 
given Hohfeldian privilege is the absence of (the negation of) a certain 
duty.  The existence of a given privilege amounts, in fact, according to 
my analysis, to the absence of conclusive backing for a certain  prescrip-
tion, the presence (availability) of which establishes a certain duty. 
  To avert another possible difficulty  : It might possibly be thought 
that whereas  `NWNp' and "not p," where "p" is a prescription, are simul-
taneously acceptable,  'A has the privilege with respect to B of doing X' 
and  'A, do not do  X  !' clearly are not, and so my analysis must be in-
correct. (And similarly for  ̀ 1\111Vp' and "not p," in relation to A's privilege 
of not doing X and  'A, do  X  !'.) The answer, I think, is that  `NWNp' 
and  "not p" are not simultaneously acceptable, for, briefly, if it is not 
that case that there is conclusive backing available for the prescription 
"not p
," then it is not the case that the prescription "not p" is to be 
followed (though it may still be permissable to follow it). 
   A further advantage of my analysis is that it provides a ready expla-
nation of the prescriptive force, i. e., the capability of serving as answers 
to questions which are requests for directions, of statements ascribing 
rights and duties. For if to ascribe a right or a duty is to assert that there 
are available conclusive reasons for doing such and such, then one who 
ascribes a right or a duty says something which implies, in the broad 
sense introduced above, that such and such is to be done (and thus he 
may be presumed to believe that such and such is to be done). Similarly, 
the present analysis provides a ready explanation of the incapability of 
statements ascribing privileges and no-rights to serve as complete answers 
to questions which are requests for directions. For to state that there are 
 not conclusive reasons available for doing such and such, or for not doing 
such and such, is not to say anything which implies that such and such is 
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or is not to be  done. 
 Furthermore, the present analysis provides a means of exhibiting in a 
grammatically perspicuous fashion some of  the logical relations of rights, 
duties, privileges, and  no-rights. (This is an argument for the usefulness 
of the analysis, not a further argument for its  correctness.) For example, 
it is not immediately obvious that (1)  'A has a duty to B to do X,' and (2) 
'A  has the privilege with respect  to  B of not doing X' are  contradictories . 
But this  is immediately obvious in  the case of (1')  'There is conclusive 
backing available for the prescription : "A, do  X  !'", and (2')  'It is not 
 the case  that  there is conclusive backing available for the  prescription  : 
 "A,  do  X  !  " 
   Let me add here that  my  analysis has the advantage over certain 
 possible,  alternative analyses that it presents the relations of contrariety, 
contradictoriness,  subcontrariety, and implication which hold among 
rights, duties, privileges, and no-rights  as logical relations,  which, they are. 
This, I think, could not  be done by, for example, an analysis which 
equated having a right or duty etc. with  being  in a certain state of mind. 
 Moreover, my analysis may,  I think, be put to use in the solution of 
certain problems concerning rights,  duties, privileges, and no-rights, which 
have a distinctly  metaphysical or philosophical ring. For example :  How 
can mental and physical facts (to use Hohfeld's expression)  possibly give 
rise to, e. g., a legal duty, something  apparently of such an utterly different 
 kind  ? The answer,  I think, in outline,  is  that they  can  provide backing 
for a prescription. 
   Now consider for a moment the  following  questions. (1) Is to ascribe 
a  moral  duty  to someone to make a  statement  ? (2) If so, how are we to 
account for the  attractiveness, of the contention that the ascription of a 
 -moral  duty amounts basically to  an.expression of  emotion  ? (3) Again 
if so, what connection is there between the truth  of the  statement made 
in the ascription of a moral duty and  people's desires  and  emotions  ? 
These  are  difficult, and important questions of ethical  theory. Perhaps 
 my analysis of statements ascribing legal duties,  slightly,  inodffied, would 
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throw some light upon  them;  this, surely, would redound to its  Credit. 
Let us, then, assume for the moment that  'A has a (moral) duty to do X' 
can be restated as follows :  'There is conclusive backing (of a moral 
nature) available for the  prescription  : "A, do  X  !  "'. (I will leave open 
for the moment the question what sort of backing  might  constitute moral 
 backing:) On this  assumption,' it is clearly the  case that to  ascribe a moral 
duty to  someone is to make  a' statement. This  conclusion., by 'the way, 
 is,. I think, supported by the fact that one can respond without  impro-
priety to  'A has a moral duty to  do X'  by. saying  'That's true' or  'No, 
that's false.' 
   Let us consider question (3) next. This question can now be put as 
follows. What connection, if any, is there between (a)  the truth of the 
statement  'There is conclusive backing (of a moral nature) available for 
the  prescription  : "A; do X  !  "  and (b) people's desires and  emotions  ? 
Let us ask  upon'  what the truth of this statement depends. Clearly, it 
depends upon there being conclusive  backing  of a moral nature avail-
able for the  prescription  : "A, do  X  !  "  . So the question  becomes  : 
What connection is there between there being  'conclusive backing of a 
moral nature available for the  prescription  : "A, do  X  !  " and people's 
desires and  emotions  ? At this point,  we  must, I think, ask what the 
nature of such backing might be. Conclusive backing for  the prescription 
"A
,  do  X  !  "  would constitute (could be presented  as) the premisses of a 
 sound argument having the prescription "A,  :do  X  !  " as its  conclusion: 
Now near the top of page 11 above, I give an example of an argument 
for a  prescription.  :One of the premisses of that argument, as I  point , out; 
is  itself a prescription. Now it appears to  me,  -though I am not entirely 
 sure  of it, that an argument whose conclusion is' a prescription  must have 
at least  one premiss which is  a:  prescription.  Perhaps it will be objected 
that premiss (2) of  the argument near  the top of page  11 could just as 
 well be  Trona among the options, you  should  buy that car which is 
the safest,'  in, which case that argument would  haVe  a prescription as its 
conclusion, but no  prescriptions  among its premisses.  I agree that the 
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soundness of that argument would be preserved through this substitution, 
but, in accordance with what I say on pages 6-7 above, it appears to me 
that statements featuring the verb  'should' are warrant statements that 
imply  prescriptions. This is how I would explain the adequacy of the 
substitution here suggested. I will proceed to ignore the case of argu-
ments that have prescriptions as conclusions and statements implying 
prescriptions, instead of prescriptions, as premisses, since their existence 
does not, I think, tell against the point I want to make. Let us  suppose; 
then, at least for the moment, that an argument whose conclusion is a 
prescription must have at least one premiss which is a prescription. Part 
of the backing to which one refers when one says  'There is conclusive 
backing (of a moral nature) available for the prescription : "A, do  X!"' 
will, then,  consist of a  prescription. 
   Now let me raise again a question I touched upon briefly  above  : 
What mode of justification is appropriate to  prescriptions  ? The most 
promising answer appears to me to be one I have already suggested in 
 passing  : Justification of a prescription consists, ultimately, in reference 
to the desires of the parties concerned. Needless to say, this answer calls 
for a great deal of amplification and qualification, as, for example, on the 
following points. (a) Who exactly are the parties concerned in cases 
in which the question arises whether a given prescription is  justified  ? Are 
they to be identified with the people who would be affected in any way, or 
in certain special ways, by the carrying out of or failure to carry out 
the action enjoined by the prescription in  question  ? Or are they to be 
identified with the people to whom that prescription is addressed, or per-
haps with both or neither of these  groups  ? (b) Is it not the case that one 
prescription can be justified by reference to  another  ? For example, might 
not  'Do not touch that  painting  !' be justified by reference to a  sign on the 
wall that says  'Do not handle exhibits  !  ' ? (This is why it is necessary 
to add the qualification  'ultimately' to the suggestion that justification of 
a prescription consists in reference to the desires of the parties concerned.) 
(c) Prescriptions are used in many different types of situations. It is 
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undoubtedly true that with reference to some of these types of situations, 
the claim that justification of a prescription consists ultimately in reference 
to the desires of the parties concerned is simply false. It remains to be 
spelled  'out,  therefore, with reference to which types of situations this 
claim holds true.  I  will do no more in the way of spelling this out than 
to assert once more that it seems to me  that  prescriptions that are invoked 
in defense of ascriptions of moral duties are to be justified, ultimately, by 
reference to people's desires. Perhaps we may  conclude, then, tentatively, 
that if  'A has a (moral)  'duty to do X' is  true, then so is  'There is conclu-
sive backing (of a  moral nature) available for the  prescription  : "A, do  
!  "  '  ; that if  'There is conclusive backing (of a moral nature) available 
for the  prescription  :  "A,'  do  X!"  ' is true, then a sound  argument can 
be  constructed. having  "A, do  X  !" as its conclusion and at least one pre-
scription among its premisses ; that if a sound argument can be constructed 
 having, "A, do  X  !  " as its conclusion and at least  one prescription among 
its  premisSes, then all of said  premisses, and hence said prescription or 
prescriptions, can be  justified  ; that if said prescription or prescriptions 
can be justified, then  certain  people's  desires are such and such  ;  and 
hence, that if  'A  haS a  (moral)  duty to do X' is true, then certain people's 
 desires  are such and such.  This provides,  in outline, a possible, and 
to my  mind a plausible  answer  to  question (3) above (see page  22).  It 
also goes at least  part way towards answering question (2)  above; the 
question how to account for the attractiveness of the  contention that the 
ascription of a moral duty amounts  basically  to an  expression' of emotion, 
though  an,examination of the  history of this question would, no doubt, 
turn up additional explanations. For if the very validity (on the account 
I  am  defending, the truth) of an  ascription of a moral duty depends essen-
tially upon the state of people's desires, it is easy to see that one might 
take an ascription of a moral duty to be itself an  expression of desire or 
emotion. Under  the analysis I am defending,  then, it can be shown 
plausibly and concretely how ascriptions of moral duties can be  state-
ments, as they seem to be, given the way they  are treated in ordinary 
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speech, while yet they have an essential connection with people's desires 
and emotions. Whether this in itself lends much weight to the analysis 
 I  am not sure. 
   The following problem has arisen. If we are to distinguish moral 
duties from legal duties (and moral rights from legal rights, moral privi-
leges from legal privileges, etc.) by reference to  the  character of the circum-
stances out of which they arise, which seems a  plausible way of distin-
guishing them even if the present analysis be rejected, then it must be the 
case that people  are able to recognize certain circumstances  as being of 
the type out of which moral duties arise, and certain circumstances as 
being of the type out of which legal duties arise. Now it seems to me that 
no great  difficulty stands in the way of specifying what circumstances are 
of this latter type : for certain transactions, undergone in certain situa-
tions, are more or  less  clearly recognized as giving rise to legal duties. But 
how are we to specify what circumstances are  of the type out of which 
moral duties arise ? It seems, at least at first sight, that it might prove 
very difficult to give an adequate answer to this question. Some people, I 
suppose, would answer that certain rules laid down in a certain religious 
work specify the circumstances out of which moral duties arise. They 
would thus, it seems to me, be attempting to establish, or arguing as if 
they were attempting to establish, a more or less rough parallel between 
the circumstances out of which moral duties arise, and the way in which 
moral duties arise out of them, on the one hand, and the circumstances 
out of which legal duties arise, and the way in which legal duties arise 
out of them, on the other. It is certainly tempting to  try, to view the 
circumstances out of which moral duties arise as being specified by rules 
laid down by a supreme authority—this, it seems to me, is at least the 
tendency of Austin (the jurisprudent), for example. But for those of us 
who find it difficult to identify said rules or said authority, the interesting 
fact, I think, is the apparent lack of any such parallel as that here 
suggested between the sources and mode of origin of moral duties and the 
sources and mode of origin of legal duties. It would appear that to view 
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the former on the  model of the latter is simply a mistake. 
   A promising view, in my opinion, is this. Moral duties etc.  character-
istically arise out of situations in which there exist at once more or less 
serious needs and possibilities of meeting them. This no doubt stands in 
need of supplementation, and, moreover, is admittedly rather vague. But 
perhaps there is in fact no well-defined set of types of situations out of 
which moral duties etc. arise. (One might even entertain the suggestion 
that we should abandon the terms  ̀ moral,'  morality,' etc. entirely—except 
for purposes of discussing what Austin called  'positive morality'—on 
account  of  their suggestion of a definite field of  inquiry, , and speak instead 
simply of what is sensible and foolish.)  At  any rate—whether or not this 
is to its credit—the present analysis of legal duties etc. brings this problem 
clearly to the fore. 
   It appears that an animal can have a right (e. g., not to be tortured) 
but not  a, duty (e.g., not to torture other animals), though it is not entirely 
clear that this is so. Perhaps the present analysis can provide some insight 
into this matter. If animals can have rights, it must  make, sense at least 
sometimes to say something like  `(Animal) A  has a right that (person) B 
do X.' That  is,, assuming the correctness of an extended form of the 
present analysis, it must at least sometimes make sense to say something 
like  'There is conclusive backing (which includes considerations having to 
do with animal A) available for the prescription : "(Person) B, do  X  !" 
I can think of nothing that indicates that it never makes  sense to say 
something like this. On the other hand, if animals can have duties, it 
must at least sometimes make sense to say something  like  ̀ (Animal) A has 
a duty to [e.  g.] (person) B to do X.' That is, assuming the correctness of 
an extended form of  the' present analysis, it must at least sometimes make 
sense to say something like  'There is conclusive backing (which includes 
considerations having to do with person B) for the  prescription  : "(Animal) 
A, do  X  !"  '. But there is something incongruous about such a statement. 
I am not quite sure what it is—perhaps the fact that, ordinarily at any 
rate, an. animal cannot be said to follow a prescription as such (although 
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an animal can in  some  cases'be  made  'to perform  the action enjoined by  a 
prescription);  perhap's, too, a  preScription, as  such,  cannot  ordinarily be 
addressed to an animal. (The present discussion suggests that the  cOrrela-
tivity of Hohfeldian  rights and duties might break  down  when rights and 
duties are considered in a broader context than that  in  Which  'Hohfeld con-
siders them.  That (1)  ̀ (Person)  A  ha's  a  duty to  (persoti)  B to do X' and 
 (2):  ̀ (Person) B has a right that (person) A do  X'  are restatements of one 
another  seems dependent  upon  the fact that A and B  are  bOth persons.) 
   Hohfeld  says:'  that, the 'fundamental legal  relations; among  which he 
includes (Hohfeldian) rights, privileges, duties,  and  no-tights, are sui 
 geheris, and  that  for this  reason  "attempts  at  formal  definition are always 
 unsatisfactory, if not  altogether useless." It is interesting  to note that the 
same thing—or what I think to be the same thing, for I  am  not sure 
exactly  what Hohfeld  means by "formal  defihition"-L--that Hohfeld here 
says about  e. g., the concept of a right has  been said by others  about the 
 concept of goodness and  the, concept of  knowledge: This is particularly 
 interesting  in light of the  fact  that plausible warrant  statement analyses 
have  been  offered by Fogelin  of statements featuring the terms  'good' and 
 `knows.'  The warrant statement  restatements of  'X is good' and  'A  knows 
that p' that are  offered  by Fogelin,  and the  'warrant statement restate-
ment of  ̀ .8  has a  Illohfeldiani right that A do X' that I  have offered 
have this in  common  : their warrant components refer  to backing 
for a  statement  or prescription (as must  be the  case if  they are to be 
 warrant statements), but they  do not list  or present that backing. It may 
 be  that the fact that terms like  ̀ duty,'  good,' and  'knows,' which are 
marks  of  warrant statements of this type, can all appear  to the philosopher 
to be indefinable is somehow a consequence of their  roles in warrant 
 statements of this  type. It is quite easy to see a connection here. Take, 
 for example, the case of the term  'good.' If, to give a very rough account 
 Of Fogelin's view,  'X  is good' means something like  'There are adequate 
grounds for  choosing' X,'  whete  the grounds in question are now these, 
now  those, then,  clearly, being good  cannot  be identified as a matter of 
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definition with being large (although the  fact of being large might some-
times  .be the justification  for calling something good), nor with being small 
(although, similarly, the fact of being small might sometimes be the 
justification for calling something good), nor with having any quality in 
particular except, trivially, that of being good. Similarly, if  'B has a right 
that A do X' means, basically,  'There is conclusive backing (which in-
cludes considerations having to do with B) available for the  prescription  : 
"A
, do  X  !"', where the backing referred to by means of the warrant 
component is now this, now that, then, clearly, having a right cannot be 
identified as a matter of definition with the fact of having entered into a 
contract (although the fact of having entered into a contract might some-
times be the justification for the ascription of a right), nor with the fact of 
having been injured by someone's dangerous pet (although the fact of 
having been injured by someone's dangerous pet might sometimes , at least 
in part, be the justification for the ascription of a right), nor with the fact 
of any particular event's having occurred or situation's having obtained. 
But, of course, if  'X is good' and  'B has a right that A do X' are indeed 
implicit warrant statements of the type described above, then it is a mis-
take to try to  define  .  . is good' as  meaning  .  . is large' or  . is pleas-
ant' etc., or to try to define  . has a right' as  meaning  .  .  . has entered 
into a favorable contract'  or  .  . has been injured by someone's danger-
ous pet' etc. It is, if the present analysis is correct , a mistake which 
manifests a failure to understand the role of the terms  'good' and  'a right' 
in warrant statements. Now I am not entirely sure why Hohfeld con-
cludes that the concepts  `right,'  duty,"privilege,' and  'no-right' are sui 
generis and incapable of formal definition, nor, as I stated, am I entirely 
sure what he means when he says that they are  sui generis and incapable 
of formal definition, but nevertheless, it seems to me quite possible, or 
perhaps I should say quite probable, that he has made the mistake I have 
just described. 
   In summary, I have put  forward an analysis of Hohfeldian rights , 
duties, privileges, and no-rights, argued that it does not have any gross 
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logical defects, and indicated how it might be given further support. The 
analysis is clearly incomplete, but it appears to me to be a step in the 
right direction. 
                        NOTES 
      Both in form and in content, this paper owes a great deal to the work of 
   Robert J. Fogelin. I do not wish to claim as mine any idea or argument that 
   is not very clearly the product of my own efforts. 
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